Beeching’s report The Reshaping of British Railways was published on March 25, 1963 and yet – 60 years later – it continues to resonate as one of the most influential documents that has shaped transport policy over subsequent decades.
After the railways were nationalised in 1948, the country’s economic landscape changed beyond measure, as Britain recovered from the hardship of the Second World War. But the railway industry carried on much as before – continuing with steam traction, uncompetitive journey times, low-capacity wagons, and vacuum rather than air brakes.
Despite an ambitious modernisation plan being revealed in 1955, financial performance continued to deteriorate. By 1961, receipts of £474 million were a long way short of the £562 million working expenses and, with the cost of capital added, the deficit reached some £136 million (equivalent to £2.9 billion today).
What was to follow was undoubtedly a tragedy for a way of life that was familiar to many, as route and station closures acknowledged the reality that car ownership would be the future way to travel about for most people. There was also growth in commercial road transport that reduced rail goods traffic, even before construction of the motorway network.
Prior to publication of his report, Beeching spent time analysing what he described as the problems that faced the railway, as well as the potential it offered. On the one hand, the rail network was a system of set routes for exclusive use that made high fixed costs inevitable; but on the other, it offered the benefit of safe, reliable and scheduled high-speed movements and an ability to operate high-capacity freight trains with low unit costs.
Richard Beeching’s report The Reshaping of British Railways was to have a profound effect on rail transportation for decades to follow its 1963 publication date.
Vast underusage
Investigation revealed that one third of the route mileage carried around 1% of passenger and freight volumes, while figures for half the network were little better at just 4% of passenger and 5% of freight.
So much for the diagnosis, but what about the remedy? It was pretty stark: the network was simply too big for the level of demand that existed and was incapable of attracting sufficient traffic to pay for the infrastructure costs. It was found that a typical secondary route required at least 10,000 passengers per week to pay its way if freight was also carried, and 17,000 if no freight was present.
Half the network of the early 1960s accounted for a tiny fraction of overall income, as typified by ex-GWR tank No. 1451 arriving at a deserted Cold Harbour Halt with the 11.25am Tiverton Junction to Uffculme on September 13, 1962 – a year before the station and line closed to passengers.
C I C HEMPHILL