The problem of evil is one of the most profound philosophical challenges to the belief in an omnipotent God. How can the existence of evil and suffering be reconciled with an all-powerful good God? Epicurus is said to have provided a thought-provoking formulation of the problem at around the turn of the third century BCE, which can be summarised:
“Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is not omnipotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Then whence cometh evil? Is he neither able nor willing? Then why call him God?”
These inquiries encapsulate the crux of ‘the problem of evil’ (also called ‘theodicy’): if God allows evil’s existence, does this not cast doubt upon either his benevolence or his omnipotence? The tension posed by Epicurus’s questions challenge the foundations of monotheism.