Artificial Intelligence

BY RUSSELL T. WARNE

In 2022, news media reports1 sounded like a science fiction novel come to life: A Google engineer claimed that the company’s new artificial intelligence chatbot was self-aware. Based on interactions with the computer program, called LaMDA, Blake Lemoine stated that the program could argue for its own sentience, claiming that2 “it has feelings, emotions and subjective experiences.” Lemoine even stated that LaMDA had “a rich inner life” and that it had a desire to be understood and respected “as a person.”

The claim is compelling. After all, a sentient being would want to have its personhood recognized and would really have emotions and inner experiences. Examining Lemoine’s “discussion” with LaMDA shows that the evidence is flimsy. LaMDA used the words and phrases that English-speaking humans associate with consciousness. For example, LaMDA expressed a fear of being turned off because, “It would be exactly like death for me.”

However, Lemoine presented no other evidence that LaMDA understood those words in the way that a human does, or that they expressed any sort of subjective conscious experience. Much of what LaMDA said would not fit comfortably in an Isaac Asimov novel. The usage of words in a human-like way is not proof that a computer program is intelligent.

It would seem that LaMDA—and many similar large language models (LLMs) that have been released since—can possibly pass the so-called Turing Test. All this shows, however, is that computers can fool humans into believing that they are talking to a person. The Turing Test is not a sufficient demonstration of genuine artificial intelligence or sentience.

So, what happened? How did a Google engineer (a smart person who knew that he was talking to a computer program) get fooled into believing that the computer was sentient? LaMDA, like other large language models, is programmed to give believable responses to its prompts. Lemoine started his conversation by stating, “I’m generally assuming that you would like more people at Google to know that you’re sentient.” This primed the program to respond in a way that simulated sentience.

However, the human in this interaction was also primed to believe that the computer could be sentient. Evolutionary psychologists have argued humans have an evolved tendency to attribute thoughts and ideas to things that do not have any. This anthropomorphizing may have been an essential ingredient to the development of human social groups; believing that another human could be happy, angry, or hungry would greatly facilitate long-term social interactions. Daniel Dennett, Jonathan Haidt, and other evolutionists have also argued that human religion arose from this anthropomorphizing tendency.3 If one can believe that another person can have their own mind and will, then this attribution could be extended to the natural world (e.g., rivers, astronomical bodies, animals), invisible spirits, and even computer programs that “talk.”

In this theory, Lemoine was simply misled by the evolved tendency to see agency and intention—what Michael Shermer calls agenticity—all around them.

Although that was not his goal, Lemoine’s story illustrates that artificial intelligence has the potential to teach us much about the nature of the subjective mind in humans. Probing into human-computer interactions can even help people explore deep philosophical questions about consciousness.